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ABSTRACT 
Focusing on a remote area in rural China, we use a panel census of households in 26 villages to 
show that socially observable spending has risen sharply in recent years. We demonstrate that 
such spending by households is highly sensitive to social spending by other villagers. This 
suggests that social spending is either positional in nature (that is, motivated by status concerns) 
or subject to herding behavior. We also document systematic relations between social spending 
and changes in higher order terms of the income distribution. In particular, and consistent with 
theories of rank-based status seeking, we find the poor increase spending on gifts as the income 
distribution tightens so that local competition for status intensifies. In addition families of 
unmarried men (who face grim marriage prospects given China’s high sex ratios, especially in 
poor areas) intensify their competition for status by increasing their spending on weddings. The 
welfare implications of spending in order to “keep up with the Joneses” are potentially large, 
particularly for poor households.    
Keywords:  positional spending, status, poverty 
JEL Codes: D12, H31, I32 vi 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Although standard economic theory assumes that individuals derive utility from absolute levels of 
consumption, it is well understood that people also care about how their consumption compares to that of 
others. One reason is that relative consumption is closely linked to social status. Concern about one’s 
status might be based on “hardwiring” of preferences shaped by some historically distant evolutionary 
process, or it may simply follow because it has instrumental value today (see, for example, Postlewaite 
1998).
1
In the race for social status, an inherent conflict emerges between individual and social welfare, 
because negative externalities caused by positional spending imply inefficient equilibrium outcomes 
(Frank 2005, 2008). In addition to such efficiency costs, Frank (2008) noted that in U.S. counties with 
high income inequality, intense competition for social status leads to higher median housing prices, 
higher personal bankruptcy rates, and a higher incidence of divorce
.
 Regardless of its origin, however, sensitivity to relative income and consumption implies that 
issues such as labor supply, savings, and consumption choices are not invariant with respect to the 
behavior of others. The pursuit of status leaves a behavioral trail. 
2
Interestingly, status may not necessarily be a luxury good because it is especially sought after by 
the rich. Although findings by Heffetz (2007) suggest that status seeking through conspicuous spending is 
only relevant for the richest half of the U.S. population, anecdotal evidence does corroborate Veblen’s 
argument that “no class of society, not even the abjectly poor, foregoes all customary conspicuous 
consumption” (1899, 85). For instance, van Kempen (2003) demonstrated that the poor in Bolivia are 
willing to trade off the consumption of nonpositional goods for extra consumption of designer-label 
goods in an effort to “keep up with the Joneses.” Similarly, Banerjee and Duflo (2007) found that the 
median household in Udaipur, India—where 86 percent  of the population lives below the US$2-per-day 
poverty line—spends 10 percent of its annual budget on festivals and 5 percent  on tobacco and alcohol, 
which are typically consumed in social settings. This is a striking outcome for a region in which 65 
percent of the men and 40 percent of the women have body mass indexes below 18.5, a figure that the 
World Health Organization considers to be an indicator of long-term malnutrition (WHO 1995).  
  
Other forms of conspicuous spending by the poor include spending on funerals, marriages, and 
gifts. For example, Case et al. (2008) observed that South African households spend the equivalent of one 
year’s income to bury deceased household members, while The Economist (2007) reported on “splendid” 
funerals in Ghana, where the typical burial costs between US$2,000 and US$3,500, despite 79 percent of 
the population living on less than US$2 per day. In each case, such lavish spending is intended to indicate 
the social status of the deceased and the “quality” of the mourning family. In a similar fashion, Anderson 
(2007) provided evidence that high brideprices and dowries are used to attract socially desirable marital 
partners for one’s children. The amounts involved are often substantial, with marital transfers amounting 
to six times the annual household income in south Asia (Rao 1993) and four times the annual household 
                                                       
1 Relative consumption effects can also originate when status has instrumental value—perhaps because it determines access 
to valuable resources, such as potential mates (see, for example, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 1992). Alternatively, preferences 
for relative consumption may be a side effect or relic from an ancient evolutionary process, such as the processing of imperfect 
information in a fluctuating environment. In this context, consumption by peers contains information about the state of the 
environment and helps us behave optimally (see, for example, Samuelson 2004).  
2 Moreover, considerable empirical evidence suggests that a person’s well-being is affected by relative income and 
consumption. For example, according to Stutzer (2004), income aspirations rise with average community income in Switzerland, 
and yet increasing aspirations result in decreased subjective well-being. Luttmer (2005) found that self-reported happiness of 
people is negatively affected by higher earnings of their neighbors. Similarly, Shilpi and Fafchamps (2003) found that poor 
households’ subjective assessment of the adequacy of their housing, food, clothing, healthcare, and schooling consumption is 
strongly correlated with the average consumption level of community members in Nepal. Easterlin (1995) reported a positive 
correlation between individual income and self-reported happiness (see also Diener et al. 1993), but found that average happiness 
is not highly correlated with national income and does not respond strongly to changes in income over time (see also Frank 
1985a; Oswald 1997). Easterlin thus concluded that relative income is more important than absolute income as a determinant of 
subjective well-being—in other words, income comparisons do matter. (See Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008 for a treatment of 
micro and macro evidence and an overview of theoretical approaches to explain “Easterlin’s paradox.”) 2 
income in Africa (Dekker and Hoogeveen 2002). Moreover, Anderson (2007) showed that marriage 
payments rise during periods of increasing income inequality in settings such as Bangladesh. In the 
context of gift exchange, Yan (1996) found that practices in China include elements intended to 
manipulate social relations and to challenge social status, and that competitive gift giving frequently 
ensues. 
It is not evident, however, that escalating marital transfers or expenses related to funerals and gift 
giving measure more intense status seeking. For example, it could be that people respond to the behavior 
of their peers because of their own desire to conform. Such herding behavior may be triggered by 
sanctions on deviants who violate social rules or norms, positive payoff externalities, a preference for 
conformity, or informational cascades (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992). 
While not relevant for expenses on funerals and weddings, gift giving may serve another purpose. Rural 
areas in developing countries offer limited opportunities for smoothing consumption via “formal” 
financial and insurance markets, and self-protection and risk sharing via informal and voluntary 
community structures are prominent approaches to reducing exposure to risk (see, for example, 
Rosenzweig 1988, Coate and Ravallion 1993, Townsend 1994, Udry 1994).
3 Changes in the exposure to 
risk could invite changing patterns of gift giving that are unrelated to status seeking.
4
For this reason, it is worthwhile to clarify two concepts —social spending and positional 
spending. The former is a broad category of expenditures that is at least partly motivated by the spending 
decisions of others and that encompasses positional spending as a special case. Positional spending, then, 
focuses on status seeking as the deeper motivation for a concern about relative consumption. 
Distinguishing between status seeking and evolving social norms (or risk sharing) to explain observed 
spending patterns is far from straightforward, as it requires specific theories and detailed expenditure data 
for reference groups. 
 Thus, it is important 
to distinguish between the underlying mechanisms when analyzing relations between consumption of 
individuals and consumption of the aggregate community within which the individual resides.  
In this paper, we aim to make some progress toward documenting patterns of social spending in 
rural China and unraveling the underlying mechanisms. In order to do so, we first describe recent trends 
in various forms of social spending, including household expenditures on funerals, weddings, and gifts. 
Second, we assess the determinants of such spending, focusing on the average level of spending in the 
community as an important potential contributing factor. Moreover, because we have collected spending 
data on several goods, we can assess whether the motives behind social spending are consistent across 
goods. Third, consistent with the theory of rank-based status (as outlined in the next section), we explore 
whether changes in income distribution prompt certain groups to disproportionately change their social 
spending, evidence of which would suggest that status concerns may underlie these patterns. Finally, we 
describe some of the welfare implications of the race for status on poor households. 
The analysis is undertaken via a new panel survey of households in three administrative villages 
in China’s Guizhou province. The survey was administered to every household in the three administrative 
villages, which means we have a complete picture of relative status without having to rely on sampling.
5
We then demonstrate that social spending in our surveyed villages has increased much faster than 
income. We also demonstrate correlations between funeral and gift expenditures on the one hand and 
 
Moreover, employing panel data eliminates concerns about simultaneity and omitted variable bias, which 
may arise in a cross-section.  
                                                       
3 Such sharing is usually studied by focusing on self-enforcing arrangements as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated 
games. Binding participation and incentive constraints typically imply limited mutual insurance possibilities, the implications of 
which have been studied in some detail by economists. For example, Coate and Ravallion (1993) analyzed stationary schemes; 
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2003) considered nonstationary schemes with history-dependent transfers—blurring the distinction 
between insurance and credit; and Genicot and Ray (2003) analyzed coalition stability in the presence of potential defection by 
subgroups of individuals. 
4 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this important point. 
5 As pointed out by Santos and Barrett (2008), analyzing social networks with sample data may significantly affect the 
accuracy of inference.  3 
lagged levels of aggregate spending in these same areas on the other, a result that holds even when we 
control for income and household demographics. These patterns of social spending are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of several status models but do not exclude alternative explanations, such as 
herding behavior. To distinguish between status seeking and other motives, we test a hypothesis based on 
the class of rank-based status models and link social spending to higher moments of income distribution 
within the reference population. We find evidence of status seeking, with the poor being especially 
sensitive to status concerns; within this group, status appears to be derived from spending on funerals, 
weddings (for the groom’s family), and gifts. For middle-income and high-income households, however, 
increased spending on status goods appears to be better explained by evolving social norms. Finally, 
spending on weddings by the bride’s family follows none of these patterns, suggesting that some forms of 
socially observable spending are subject neither to herding nor to status concerns. Hence, status seeking 
manifests itself differently for different types of positional goods and for different income classes. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the literature on exogenous changes in 
the distribution of income and status seeking. In Section 3, we describe positional spending in China, 
outline our empirical strategy, and describe our data. In Section 4, we present the empirical results and 
relate them to our model. The conclusions and discussion ensue. 4 
2.  SOCIAL SPENDING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
We begin with a general specification that captures the idea that people care about their own behavior and 
payoffs relative to those of others. This paper initially focuses on status seeking as the deeper motivation 
for a concern about relative consumption and then returns to herding behavior and risk sharing.  
We define xi as an individual’s own consumption of a “visible” good that may confer status when 
consumed by individual i; we define y as that individual’s consumption of a good that is not visible (and 
hence cannot confer status). We define x ö as a measure of spending on good x by others in the reference 
population (see below), Zi as a vector of socioeconomic and demographic variables, and p as the relative 
price of good x. We assume agent i’s utility as  
  ˆ (,; ;,) i ii U Ux xZ pI = ,  (1) 
in which we have used the budget constraint Ii = pxi + yi to eliminate y so that I denotes income. If the 
individual’s utility is influenced by relative spending—for example, by differences between xi and x ö—
then one possible specification of (1) is  
  ˆ ( ) (1 ) ( , ) ii i U S x x V x I px αα = −+− − ,  (2) 
where S is a subutility function that captures the benefits of status, V is a subutility function that captures 
utility from an individual’s own consumption, and  1 0 ≤ ≤α  is a parameter that measures the strength of 
concerns about status. For  0 → α , the problem reduces to a conventional utility-maximization exercise 
in which social spending plays no role. For α > 0, the specification in (2) implies that people derive utility 
(or disutility) from spending more (or less) than others on visible goods.  
It is easy to show that introducing a concern about the relative consumption of visible goods 
implies that spending on the social good is increased, relative to spending in conventional models (where 
α = 0). However, the comparative statics indicating whether people spend more or less on social goods in 
response to changes in the expenditures of their peers are less clear. Solving for  0 / = ∂ ∂ i i x U  and then 
differentiating yields 
 
yy xy xx xx
xx i




2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ö α α α α
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,  (3) 
where variable subscripts denote (partial) derivatives. The denominator of the right hand side of (3) is 
negative, by the requirement that the maximization problem is concave; the sign of the numerator, 
however, may be negative or positive, depending on whether S(⋅) is concave or convex. Thus, the sign of 
x xi ö /∂ ∂  is ambiguous, and both “follower” ( x xi ö /∂ ∂  > 0) and “deviant” behavior ( x xi ö /∂ ∂  < 0) may 
ensue. Concave utility from status Sxx < 0 implies that an increase in positional spending by others triggers 
a “keeping up with the Joneses” response in agent i. Concave utility implies that the marginal value of 
status falls as one has more of it, and status seeking generates social spending decisions as strategic 
complements. In contrast, convex utility from status implies that the marginal utility of status increases as 
one acquires more of it, akin to risk-loving preferences in conventional models. Such preferences imply 
behavior opposite the tendencies observed in the reference group, and this outcome could describe the 
behavior of fashion leaders and individuals in counterculture groups. Hence, a fundamental result is that a 
concern for social status yields ambiguous predictions for the behavior of individuals in response to 
changes in the status-seeking behavior of others.
6
                                                       
6 The ambiguity of 
 However, the most likely case (and the one 
x xi ö /∂ ∂  is not conditional on the assumption that status utility is specified as ) ö ( x x S S i − = . For 
example, qualitatively similar results are obtained when  ) ö / ( x x S S i =  instead (see, for example, Clark and Oswald 1998). 5 
corroborating the conventional perspective on status seeking) is that the concave utility potentially results 
in spending races. 
Herein lies a problem. The standard status-seeking specification predicts  x xi ö /∂ ∂  > 0, but this is 
exactly what a simple herding model based on an (exogenously) evolving norm would predict. For 
example, relabel  ) ( ö t x j  as a spending norm on visible goods in community j at time t. If we redefine 
utility as  
  ˆ | |  (, ) ii i U S x x V x I px β = −+ − ,  (2') 
where β is a coefficient measuring the disutility associated with deviations from the spending norm, then 
we would also obtain  x xi ö /∂ ∂  > 0 as a rational equilibrium response. 
To distinguish between status seeking and herding induced by an evolving norm, we add structure 
to the model. Following Frank (1985b), Robson (1992), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004; hereafter HK), 
and Haagsma and van Mouche (2007), one might augment utility functions with a term that captures the 
ordinal “rank” of the agent in a reference population.
7
 
 This term may be captured by 
( ) I p Z x F x U U i i i i , ; ), ( , = ,  (4) 
where F(⋅) denotes a cumulative density function. The social rank of agents varies positively with the 
number of other agents that it dominates in terms of status spending; hence, U (⋅) must be increasing in 
F(⋅). The advantage of this specification is that status is not only determined by an individual’s own 
spending behavior relative to average behavior in the population, but that higher order terms of the 
spending distribution also matter. Thus, the distribution of income determines the intensity of the local 
contest for higher rank.  
To illustrate, suppose that some households within the reference population receive an exogenous 
increase in income.
8 The impact of a change in income distribution on positional spending is analyzed by 
HK, where status is modeled as the agent’s rank in terms of consumption of the positional good.
9
  S(x, F(x)) = aF(x) + (1 – a)F
–(x) + s,  (5) 
 
Specifically, building on Frank (1985b) and Robson (1992), status is defined as  
where F(x) measures the mass of individuals with lower or equal consumption of the status-conferring 
good; F
–(x) is the mass of individuals with strictly lower consumption of the status-conferring good (to 
avoid nonuniqueness of the equilibria), and s is a parameter that captures the “basic,” or minimum, level 
of status that accrues to all community members, including the one with lowest social rank, and that thus 
measures the intensity of competition for status. HK consider the following specification of utility: 
  U(⋅) = V(x, y)S(x, F(x)).  (6) 
                                                       
7 Alternatively, in the tradition of Duesenberry (1949), Pollak (1976), Oxoby (2004), and others, utility functions may be 
augmented with a term that captures average consumption within the reference population ( x ), such that the utility function is 
specified as  ( ) I p Z x x x U U i i i i , ; ), / ( , = . Depending on what we are willing to assume with respect to the specification of U, 
positional spending might again emerge as strategic complements or substitutes, but the most likely specification again produces 
x xi ∂ ∂ /  > 0. Unfortunately, not much else can be teased out of this model that allows us to distinguish between status seeking 
and norm-induced herding. 
8 The income distribution may change due to many factors. However, in the context of Chinese villages, one key factor is 
the inflow of money via remittances for some villagers and not for others. 
9 HK model the case of a continuum of individuals. Especially in the context of rural communities, however, a model based 
on a discrete number of agents, such as that of Haagsma and van Mouche (2007), may be more appropriate. Although the 
continuity assumption is not innocent in general, both the continuous and discrete models yield the ambiguous comparative 
statics with respect to exogenous changes in income distribution. 6 
They also introduce a budget constraint so that the model may be solved. In the presence of a positive 
exogenous shock to the income of some households in the reference population (due to remittances from 
family members in urban areas, for example), the Nash equilibrium response of (most) other households 
is to increase spending on status-conferring goods; this response is also an effort of those families to 
preserve their rank and status.
10
Depending on assumptions with respect to s (that is, the residual status for the lowest-ranked 
individual in society), social spending of the poorest within society may intensify or relax in response to 
changes in the income distribution. Whenever s > 0—that is, whenever the lowest-ranked individual has 
some status—HK found that a subset of the poorest not receiving remittances may decrease positional 
spending in equilibrium, because changing the income distribution implies changing the intensity of 
(local) competition for status at the bottom. Suppose, for example, that a changed income distribution 
implies “upgrading” some poor people to the middle-income echelon of the reference population such that 
the income distribution’s density mass shifts away from the low-income tail and toward the center. As a 
result, competition for status becomes less intense at the bottom, and the incentive to engage in strategic 
status seeking is mitigated, enabling the poorest to relax their spending on positional goods and to move 
toward the “conventional” (that is, the non–status seeking) efficient allocation of income. That is, they 
may buy more y and less x.
 A new equilibrium status ranking (corresponding with the ex post 
distribution of income) ensues. Households not receiving the income shock may find themselves 
surpassed on the social ladder; if so, they may experience a fall in status and utility. Of course, such 
households also suffer, because increased positional spending lowers utility from their own consumption 
by reducing V*. 
11
In contrast, when s = 0, implying pariah-like status for the lowest-ranked individual, the 
comparative statics are unambiguous. The case of s = 0 might be a realistic scenario when, for example, 
competition for mates depends on status and when the lowest-ranked individual cannot attract a spouse. In 
such a context, raising average income triggers a scramble for status that extends all the way down to the 
bottom echelons of the income distribution—that is, 
 
x xi ö /∂ ∂  > 0 for all community members. Even the 
poorest of the poor then raise their conspicuous consumption in response to an increase in income of 
some of their fellow villagers (see HK for details).  
The rank-based status model allows us to distinguish between status seeking and norm-induced 
herding as causal mechanisms of social spending, because it relates social spending to a measure of 
income inequality. Assume there are two communities that are identical in all respects but one. 
Specifically, when comparing the density functions of the income distributions, Community 1 has more 
probability mass in the tails of the distribution than does Community 2. The HK model predicts that status 
seeking will be more intense for the poor and the rich in Community 1 and for households with an income 
closer to the mean in Community 2. More intense competition for status translates into greater social 
spending (an exception exists for the poorest whenever s = 0, because, in a desperate effort to keep up, 
they may increase positional spending in response to a decrease in local density). Although changing the 
distribution of income has ambiguous effects on overall status seeking within the community, the model 
produces predictions for social spending conditional on an individual’s own income and the overall 
distribution of income within the community. In contrast, there is no reason to suspect that norm-induced 
herding is guided by income distribution. We exploit these insights to identify status seeking in our data 
and to distinguish status seeking from herding behavior.  
Similarly, we can distinguish between positional spending and risk sharing. First, and obviously, 
though risk sharing may materialize via gift giving, it is unlikely to matter for expenses on funerals and 
                                                       
10 Hence, outcomes may emerge where “everyone increases conspicuous consumption in order to improve status, but any 
gain in status is cancelled out by the similarly increased expenditures of others. Such an economy can be described as a Lewis 
Carroll ‘Red Queen’ economy, in which ‘it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place’” (Hopkins and Kornienko 
2004, p. 1086). 
11 However, the net effect on welfare considering both the re-allocation of consumption and the fall in status is necessarily 
negative, even for the poorest households; see HK. 7 
weddings. These latter categories thus provide useful expenditure categories in which to search for 
evidence of status seeking. Second, it is not obvious that spending for risk sharing purposes is responsive 
to higher order terms of income distribution. In particular, empirical work by Fafchamps and Gubert 
(2007) on risk sharing in the Philippines documents that wealth differences do play a role in the formation 
of risk-sharing links, in that poor villagers try to team up with richer ones. Gift giving occurs across the 
income distribution spectrum, and personalized links with individuals across all income groups matter (as 
opposed to the local density of the income density distribution).
12
 
 To further attenuate concerns that gift 
giving captures risk sharing rather than status seeking, we control for negative shocks to health status and 
income in the models seeking to explain gift giving. 
                                                       
12 There are two additional reasons that gift-giving data are unlikely to conflate status seeking and risk sharing. First, 
Fafchamps and Lund (2003) highlighted the important role of flexible zero-interest loans (rather than gifts) within networks of 
friends and relatives. Our dataset distinguishes between zero-interest loans and gifts, making it unlikely that these are confused 
by the respondents. Second, the respondents indicated that gift giving is associated with specific occasions. Traditionally, these 
occasions have included weddings and funerals. More recently, they also include abortion and sterilization. 8 
3.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The economic and structural transformations occurring in China in recent decades have generated one of 
the most dramatic migration dynamics in human history, unleashing entrepreneurship and suggesting that 
remittances from migration and income from nonfarm activities may challenge the existing social order in 
villages. Moreover, new occasions for gift giving (Yan 1996), as well as large increases in conspicuous 
consumptive investment relative to productive investment (de Brauw and Rozelle 2008), could be 
indicative of both status seeking and norm-induced herding. Thus, rural China is a good candidate for 
studying the rank-based status model outlined above. 
The data for this study come from a detailed panel survey of households in Guizhou Province, 
China.
13 With a poverty rate double the national average, Guizhou is the poorest province in China, an 
ideal setting for studying the implications of social spending on poor households. The survey site is 
Puding County, which consists of 11 townships, 317 administrative villages,
14
Three administrative villages that represent the broad range of economic development in Puding 
were chosen by survey enumerators, including one of the authors. In late 2004, a census-type survey of all 
805 households in the 26 natural villages making up the three administrative villages was administered.
 and a total population of 
402,000. Per capita income in Puding County is above the provincial median but below the provincial 
mean, suggesting that its income profile is representative of Guizhou as a whole. At the end of 2002, 
approximately 120,000 people in Puding (31 percent of the population) were officially designated as poor 
(PAO 2003). About 94 percent of the population resides in rural areas, and agricultural labor accounts for 
approximately two-thirds of the total labor force. More than 20 ethnic groups are represented in Puding, 
including Han (the ethnic majority on China), Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and Yi; in total, ethnic minorities make 
up about 20 percent of the population. 
15
Table 1 presents summary statistics for each of the three administrative villages in 2004. The first 
administrative village comprised 11 natural villages, totaling 257 households, and is located 10 kilometers 
from the county seat over rough roads, limiting marketing opportunities for people in this village. In 
addition, water shortages are severe during dry times of the year in this village. The second administrative 
village comprises 151 households in five natural villages and is located 8 kilometers from the county seat. 
Although the distance from markets is similar to the first administrative village, a new road from this 
second village to the county seat has greatly improved access, bolstering fruit and vegetable production in 
recent years. The third administrative village comprises 10 natural villages with 393 households in total. 
It is a short walk to the county seat, so access to markets is trivial for residents of the third village. All of 
the villages are land-poor, averaging just 1 mu of cultivated land per person.
 
A follow-up survey administered in early 2007 (reflecting the year 2006) included 833 households, 
including several that resulted from new marriages. The surveys collected detailed information on 
demographics, income, consumption, and transfers. Information was collected for each household 
member, including members who were working outside the county at the time of the surveys.  
16
                                                       
13 Data collection efforts were supported by the International Food Policy Research Institute, the Chinese Academy of 
Agricultural Science, and Guizhou University.  
 However, whereas 80 
percent of the land in the third administrative village is flat (and therefore ideally suited to rice 
production), only 40 percent and 20 percent of the land in the first and second administrative villages, 
respectively, is flat. Thus, not only do residents in the third administrative village enjoy more nonfarm 
employment opportunities than people in either of the other villages, but they also have the best farming 
conditions. 
14 An administrative village is a bureaucratic entity comprised of several “natural” or “typical” villages. 
15 Officially, the three administrative villages have 987 households, but no one was home during any of three separate visits 
to 183 households. According to neighbors, most of these households had migrated out of the county and were unlikely to return. 
After data cleaning, 801 households remained in the analysis. In the 2007 survey, 833 households were surveyed. During the 
intervening time, some young people had formed new households and some households were relocated into the area from more 
remote places as part of a poverty-alleviation program, explaining the 28-household gain. 
16 One mu is equal to 666
2⁄3 square meters, which is slightly smaller than one-sixth of an acre. 9 
Table 1. Summary statistics by administrative village, 2004 





Village 3  Total 
Number of natural villages  11  5  10  26 
Total number of households  257  151  393  801 
Total population  1,089  535  1,449  3,073 
Distance to the county seat (km)  10.0  8.0  2.5  6.8 
Per capita cultivated land (mu)  0.87  0.86  1.10  0.98 
Share of total land classified as being flat (%)  40.0  20.7  80.0  53.4 
Share of households headed by males (%)  93.5  94.8  91.6  92.8 
Average education of the household head (years)  2.87  3.06  3.98  3.44 
Share of households headed by ethnic minorities (%)  76.6  12.6  6.7  30.8 
Average share of household members aged 11–29, 
unmarried (%) 
15.9  15.7  14.7  16.6 
Average share of household members aged 60 and 
above (%) 
14.2  17.9  12.5  14.1 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Although the demographic profile of the three administrative villages is similar in terms of the 
share of households headed by men (93 percent), there are some striking differences. Foremost, ethnic 
minorities make up 76 percent of the household members in the first administrative village. By contrast, 
minorities in the second and third villages make up only 13 percent and less than 7 percent of their 
populations, respectively. Second, whereas the education level of household heads averages just 3.4 years, 
household heads in the third administrative village have an average of a full year more education than 
household heads in the first administrative village. Third, households in the second administrative village 
include more elderly people than households in either of the other two administrative villages.  
Table 2 describes the various components of household income. Per capita income in 2004 
ranged from 1,009 RMB
17 in the first administrative village to 1,749 RMB in the third village. Between 
2004 and 2006, per capita net income rose by 5 percent in the first administrative village; however, this 
figure was dwarfed by the 13 percent income growth in the second administrative village and the 18 
percent income growth seen in the third administrative village. Indeed, by 2006, per capita income in the 
third administrative village was well more than double that in the first administrative village. The average 
per capita income for all three administrative villages was 1,404 RMB in 2004 and 1,817 RMB in 2006. 
The Gini index ranges from 41.6 in the third administrative village in 2004 to 52.9 in the second village in 
2006. Each of the three villages demonstrated a high degree of both skewness and kurtosis in income 
distribution.
18
                                                       
17 In 2006, RMB 1 = US$0.12 at official exchange rates.  
 
18 The skewness statistic measures the relative asymmetry of per capita income in the natural village; a positive (negative) 
skewness statistic implies a longer right (left) tail. It is the third standardized moment, calculated as 
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Table 2. Income by administrative village, 2004 and 2006 
   Admin. Village 1  Admin. Village 2  Admin. Village 3  Total 
   2004  2006  2004  2006  2004  2006  2004  2006 
Per capita annual income (RMB)  1,009  1,111  1,274  1,638  1,749  2,420  1,404  1,817 
Income inequality (Gini)   43.7  46.3  41.9  52.9  41.6  42.7  44.2  49.0 
Skewness of per capita annual income  4.2  2.9  1.8  4.6  2.9  1.9  3.2  3.1 
Kurtosis of per capita annual income  34.1  14.5  6.5  28.5  15.9  8.2  19.6  17.8 
                 
Main sources of income (%)           
Farming  26.3  26.7  31.0  37.4  37.0  31.5  33.3  31.4 
Livestock  12.3  13.3  9.1  10.9  6.0  3.4  8.1  6.8 
Local nonfarm and self-employment   31.2  18.4  22.1  18.4  39.9  40.6  34.9  32.2 
Remittance from migrants outside the county  7.8  22.4  10.9  10.2  7.3  10.7  8.0  13.1 
Disaster relief, antipoverty programs, and deforestation subsidies  5.1  2.9  2.5  6.9  1.9  0.5  2.8  2.0 
Gift income  3.1  3.9  12.1  7.0  5.2  8.7  5.8  7.4 
Other income  14.2  12.4  12.2  9.1  2.7  4.7  7.1  7.1 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
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Access to markets and to off-farm employment appear to be very important in combating poverty; 
34 percent and 28 percent of the households in the first and second administrative villages, respectively, 
earned less than the national poverty line of 680 RMB, while only 13 percent of the households in the 
third village did. In 2004, agricultural income accounted for 43 percent of total income, while off-farm 
work accounted for 35 percent. The share of income derived from agriculture increased 8 percentage 
points between 2004 and 2006 in the second village and decreased 8 percentage points over the same 
period in the third village. Remittances from migrants outside the county accounted for 8 percent of total 
income in 2004. Remittances were especially important in the first administrative village, which saw the 
share of income derived from remittances increase from 8 percent to 22 percent over the two-year period. 
By 2006, remittances made up 13 percent of household income, on average.  
Other important sources of income include a series of antipoverty subsidies from the central and 
provincial governments (accounting for 3 percent of total income in 2004 and 2 percent in 2006) and gifts 
(accounting for 6 percent of income in 2004 and more than 7 percent of income in 2006). The rise in 
income derived from gifts was especially dramatic in the third administrative village. 
Per capita consumption in the first administrative village was a very low 937 RMB in 2004, 
which was slightly more than half the level in the third village (Table 3). Despite such heterogeneity in 
per capita consumption levels, consumption grew steadily across all three administrative villages between 
2004 and 2006, averaging 13 percent at an annualized rate. Nearly half of households’ total consumption 
was allocated to food in 2004. The second-largest expenditure was medical care, accounting for about 16 
percent of total living expenditures. Fuel, education, and gift spending each represented about 8 percent of 
total expenditure in 2004. By 2006, the share of expenditures allocated to food dropped to 42 percent, 
while medical care accounted for 16 percent of expenditures. The share of spending on gifts and festivals 
soared, increasing nearly 76 percent, from 8 percent to 14 percent. Figure 1 shows the dramatic extent to 
which growth in gift expenditures outstripped growth in per capita income over the survey period. 12 
Table 3. Consumption by administrative village (2004 and 2006) and gift expenditure by administrative village (2001 and 2006) 
  
Admin. Village 1  Admin. Village 2  Admin. Village 3  Total 
   2004  2006  2004  2006  2004  2006  2004  2006 
Per capita consumption (RMB)
1  937  1,192  1,201  1,528  1,683  2,204  1,334  1,725 
Main expenditures (%)             
Food  53.8  51.1  47.1  42.9  45.4  38.5  47.8  42.2 
Clothing  4.4  4.4  3.1  3.7  4.0  4.9  4.0  4.6 
Fuel  5.9  6.4  5.4  6.9  10.2  9.5  8.4  8.3 
Telephone  1.1  2.1  1.3  2.4  1.5  3.5  1.4  3.0 
Medical care  14.1  16.7  24.7  16.8  15.2  15.2  16.4  15.8 
Education  9.0  10.0  7.9  12.2  8.8  12.3  8.7  11.7 
Gift and festival spending  6.4  9.2  6.8  13.9  8.9  15.9  7.9  13.9 
                 
   2001  2006  2001  2006  2001  2006  2001  2006 
Median per capita gift expenditure (RMB)
2  16  62.5  20  150  80  250  33.3  150 
Median gift to direct relatives per occasion (RMB)
3  30  50  30  50  50  100  40  60 
Median gift to nonrelatives per occasion (RMB)
3  10  20  15  30  25  50  20  30 
Source: Authors’ survey data.  
Notes:
1 Excludes expenditures on housing, durable goods, and weddings/funerals of family members. 
2 Measured as the median of the total household expenditure on gifts divided by the number of members in the giving household. 
3 Measured as the median of the “typical” gift made in the previous year by each household per occasion.  
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Figure 1. Annualized growth in per capita income, consumption, and gift spending by 
administrative village 
 
Source: Author’s creation based on data collection. 
 
As shown in the lower panel of Table 3, the median level of per capita spending on gifts 
(measured as total household expenditures on gifts divided by the number of members in the giving 
household) also increased dramatically, rising from 16 RMB to 63 RMB in the first administrative 
village, from 20 RMB to 150 RMB in the second village, and from 80 RMB to 250 RMB in the third 
village. The 2007 survey asked about the typical value of gifts given to direct relatives and the typical 
value of gifts given to nonrelatives during weddings and other major events in 2001 and 2006. The 
median value of gifts given at each occasion climbed from 40 RMB to 60 RMB for direct relatives, while 
the value of gifts given to nonrelatives increased from 20 RMB to 30 RMB. Thus, the value of gifts 
increased substantially over the study period. 
As in many parts of the world, weddings in China are occasions that call for significant 
expenditures. Typically, the groom and/or his family are responsible for paying the brideprice, a market-
clearing mechanism that compensates a bride’s family for rearing her and investing in her human capital 
(Zhang and Chan 1999). The brideprice is often accompanied by gifts to the bride herself (which may 
include major durables and even housing). Furthermore, the groom is responsible for paying for most of 
the wedding ceremony (Yan 1996). Because most marriages in rural China are arranged, many of these 
expenses are negotiated and incurred before the actual wedding ceremony. Dowry, by contrast, is an 
intergenerational transfer from the bride’s parents to the bride, typically funded out of the brideprice.
19
Table 4 lists each of the above expenditures for weddings taking for 1996 through 2006 (not to be 
confused with gifts to the wedding couple by guests, as these are included in the gift-giving variable). 
Because there are relatively few weddings in any given year in a village, the table reports the mean for 
 
The bride’s family may share the cost of the wedding ceremony, often when large numbers of unexpected 
guests attend the ceremony (Yan 1996).  
                                                       
19 Scholars have explained the relatively large dowries in rural China as vehicles for prestige building (Liu 2000), insurance 
against mistreatment of daughters by their in-laws (Brown 2009), and efficient premortem inherences in contexts in which 
women leave their natal families at marriage (Botticini and Siow 2003). 14 
each category across all three administrative villages. Wedding expenditures for the groom and his family 
increased over the period, with a mean nominal year-on-year increase of 10.1 percent. In 2006, for 
example, the mean wedding cost the groom’s family 11,805 RMB, which is approximately 5.5 times per 
capita income in these three administrative villages.
20
Funerals present another opportunity for conspicuous social spending on the part of the 
decedent’s family. Funerals typically last three days and attract friends, relatives, and well-wishers. The 
funeral is generally followed by a simple meal, with most of the village in attendance (Whyte 1988), 
though more recent anthropological evidence suggests that these meals have evolved into elaborate (if 
unhappy) banquets. Indeed, between 2004 and 2006, the average funeral expenditure exceeded 5,800 
RMB, which is approximately 58 percent higher (in nominal terms) than the average funeral expense 
between 1996 and 2003. For both weddings and funerals, all of the surveyed households kept detailed 
records of expenditures, as well as of gifts received,
 During this period, the expenditure for the bride’s 
side increased by 9.0 percent per year. The groom and his family clearly bore most of the financial burden 
for weddings in the surveyed area. 
21
Table 4. Median marriage and funeral expenditures (in RMB), 1996–20061 
 implying that recall error on such spending is likely 
to be minimal, even over long periods. 





Ceremony  Total  
Expenditure 




1996   2,036    679    1,786    4,500    1,300    1,857    3,157   2,688 
1997   1,572    868    950    3,852    2,308    792    3,100   3,471 
1998   2,188    773    1,303    5,211    1,858    1,167    3,025   3,170 
1999   1,165    702    1,125    3,634    2,186    1,643    3,829   4,328 
2000   3,200    646    1,957    6,250    2,279    651    2,929   4,393 
2001   2,657    2,552    2,162    7,371    3,767    1,877    5,644   3,388 
2002   2,539    1,426    1,912    7,347    2,818    1,718    4,536   3,402 
2003   2,996    2,171    2,396    7,891    3,657    1,486    5,143   4,655 
2004   5,888    803    2,931    10,423    2,743    1,500    4,243   6,150 
2005   3,825    1,814    2,123    9,486    6,296    1,336    7,633   5,156 
2006   5,186    2,006    3,875    11,805    3,745    3,757    7,502   6,175 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: Recalled during the 2007 survey.
                                                       
20 In addition, the groom is responsible for building a house for the newly married couple in the sampled areas, an expense 
that far exceeds even the cost of the wedding. 
21 Yan (1996) wrote, “Ritualized gift giving is also associated with the custom of making and preserving gift lists. Gift lists 
are homemade books on red paper (funeral gift lists are made on yellow paper) inscribed with a traditional Chinese calligraphy 
brush. They serve as a formal record of all gifts received by the host of a family ceremony.” 15 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we seek to identify the determinants of social spending. Specifically, we seek to relate 
spending patterns to the rank-based status model outlined in Section 2. Because expenditures related to 
funerals and weddings cannot be conflated with risk sharing, we start with these categories, turning to gift 
giving later. 
Table 5 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the determinants of expenditures 
on funerals. The median level of spending for each funeral in the natural village in the previous year 
captures social spending in the reference group.
22
×
 To help distinguish between status seeking and herd 
behavior (both of which are consistent with positive estimates for median spending in the previous year), 
we include in the model measures of the income distribution; dummies for low (lowest quartile), middle 
(second and third quartiles), and high (top quartile) income groups; and income distribution   income 
group interactions. Each column represents the results for a different measure of the income distribution. 
Specifically, we control for variation in the income distribution across natural villages via the Gini index 
for per capita household income in the natural village, the skewness statistic for per capita household 
income in the natural village (SK), the kurtosis statistic for per capita household income in the natural 
village (KT), and an interaction between skewness and kurtosis (SK × KT) as additional regressors. 
While the Gini index provides a snapshot of overall inequality, the latter three measures capture the 
distribution density of households with similar incomes. Statistically significant interaction terms provide 
evidence in favor of the notion that spending on weddings reflects positional concerns and is not merely 
herding behavior.  
Given the high degree of heterogeneity across villages (described in Section 3), we also include a 
series of demographic variables that capture the household head’s sex, education, and ethnicity and the 
age distribution of household members (measured by the share of unmarried household members aged 
11–29 and the share who are over age 60) for 2006. Because village cadres are normally engaged in more 
social events than others, we include a dummy variable for households with a cadre. To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, our estimates also include fixed effects at the level of the administrative 
village. 
Among the 170 households that experienced a death in the previous 10 years, the median 
expenditure on funerals in the previous year positively affects funeral expenditures at the 5 percent 
significance level; ceteris paribus, a 1 percent increase in the median expenditure on funerals in the 
previous year raises predicted funeral spending by approximately 0.18 percent. These results suggest that 
funeral expenses reflect social spending. Controlling for income and other correlates, households that 
were headed by males in 2006 spent 63 percent less on funerals than households that were headed by 
women, suggesting that wives throw more lavish funerals for their deceased husbands than vice versa. 
Ceteris paribus, households with a disproportionate share of older household members also spend more 
on funerals, as do households with a larger share of young unmarried members. Consistent with the 
results shown below, one possible explanation is that such households may signal the quality of their 
unmarried members through such visible forms of spending. 
The income distribution × income group interactions indicate that poor households spend more 
on funerals when there is a greater density of households with similar income in the natural village. The 
interaction term is statistically significant at the 10 percent level for all distribution proxies but the Gini 
coefficient, which measures inequality over the whole distribution of incomes, thereby failing to 
distinguish between the intensity of competition in the left and right tails. The other interaction results for 
the poor shown in Table 5 are incompatible with herding behavior, suggesting that funeral spending is 
indeed positional and that the poor feel the greatest pressure to compete. These results are consistent with 
                                                       
22 We also estimated each model by substituting the mean per capita expenditures for median per capita 
expenditures; the results are similar.  16 
evidence showing that the poor spend up to several years of income to bury an important member in 
South Africa (Case, Garrib, and Olgiati 2008) and in Ghana (Economist 2007).  17 
Table 5. OLS regressions for funeral expenses 
   Gini  SK
1  KT
2  SK * KT 
Per capita income in 2004 (log RMB)   0.049  0.082  0.092  0.091 
  (0.82)  (0.71)  (0.68)  (0.68) 
Male head of household (dummy)  –0.661**  –0.617*  –0.626*  –0.628*  
  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Education of household head (years)  0.024  0.024  0.023  0.022 
  (0.41)  (0.43)  (0.44)  (0.46) 
Minority head of household (dummy)  –0.154  –0.149  –0.119  –0.116 
  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.57)  (0.59) 
Cadre family  –0.044  0.026  0.007  –0.034 
  (0.90)  (0.94)  (0.98)  (0.91) 
Share of household members aged 11–29, unmarried  0.896**  0.886**  0.876**  0.899**  
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Share of household members aged 60 and above  0.637*  0.742**  0.789**  0.797**  
  (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Median expenditure per occasion in previous year (log RMB)  0.199**  0.187**  0.183**  0.182**  
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Dummy for bottom 25% of households in natural village (2004)  –0.178  0.170  0.140  0.230 
  (0.88)  (0.72)  (0.75)  (0.57) 
Dummy for top 25% of households in natural village (2004)  –1.532  –0.066  –0.013  0.057 
  (0.16)  (0.82)  (0.97)  (0.83) 
Income distribution * Dummy for bottom 25% of households in natural village  –0.014  0.073  0.020*  0.004**  
  (0.56)  (0.39)  (0.06)  (0.03) 
Income distribution * Dummy for middle 50% of households in natural village  –0.027  –0.030  –0.004  0.000 
  (0.18)  (0.65)  (0.53)  (0.44) 
Income distribution * Dummy for top 25% of households in natural village  0.015  0.096  0.017  0.004*  
  (0.29)  (0.22)  (0.15)  (0.10) 
R-squared  0.249  0.241  0.248  0.249 
AIC  439  441  439  439 
N  170  170  170  170 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: 
1 SK refers to the skewness of per capita income in the natural village. 
2 KT refers to the kurtosis of per capita income in the natural village. 
p-values (shown in parentheses) reflect standard errors clustered by natural villages. *, **, and *** indicate confidence levels of 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. Administrative 
village fixed effects are included but not reported here. 18 
Given such results, status competition among the poor may also be evident for highly visible 
expenditures associated with weddings. Because the groom’s family bears most of the responsibility for 
expenses related to marriage and captures most of the status associated with a grandiose wedding, we 
analyze the determinants of wedding expenditures separately for the groom’s family
23
For spending among groom families (Table 6a), interactions between the low-income group 
dummy and higher moments of the income distribution within the reference population again point to 
status competition. As kurtosis and skewness increase, spending on weddings among the poor increases, 
suggesting that local competition correlates with higher spending. These results are consistent with Wei 
and Zhang (2009), who demonstrated that high sex ratios have increasingly squeezed the rural poor in 
recent decades, leaving a large share of men unable to find wives. Interestingly, the skewness 
 and for the bride’s 
family.  
× kurtosis 
interaction, a better measure of local density in tails of income distribution, is also positive and 
statistically significant for the top 25 percent of the income distribution, suggesting that the rich are not 
immune to status competition through marriage (note that there is no analogous evidence for middle-
income households). However, community norms in the form of lagged median expenditures do not 
strongly affect wedding expenditures made by the groom’s family. 
As opposed to the mounting pressure for grooms, marriage markets have become more favorable 
for brides, and their families are thus less likely to engage in positional spending on weddings. Indeed, in 
most of rural China, women formally join the husband’s family at the time of marriage (Wolf and Huang 
1980), so the status value of wedding expenses for a bride’s family is limited. Such results are evident in 
Table 6b, which shows that wedding spending is largely orthogonal to income, lagged expenditures on 
weddings, and the income distribution.
24 However, the education of the household head has a strong effect 
on wedding expenditures, with an extra year of education raising marital expenditures by approximately 
12.5 percent on average, ceteris paribus.
25
                                                       
23 To avoid double counting of newly established households, we restrict the sample to households in which the head is aged 
40 or above in 2006; the results are robust to other age cutoffs. 
 At the same time, wedding spending among minority 
households is significantly lower than among nonminority households. These results suggest that 
although wedding spending for the groom’s family is indeed positional in nature, wedding spending for 
the bride’s family is subject neither to positional concerns nor to herding behavior; rather, demographics 
figure prominently into wedding expenditures for the bride’s family. 
24 The sole exception is for the interaction between the Gini index and the high-income dummy. This result suggests that the 
wealthy provide larger dowries to their daughters as local income competition shrinks; however, the other point estimates do not 
support this conclusion. 
25 This result is consistent with Brown (2009), who showed that some rural Chinese parents attempt to influence the status of 
their daughters in their conjugal homes by providing brides with more assets upon marriage.  19 
Table 6a. OLS regressions for wedding expenses paid by the groom’s family 
   Gini  SK
1  KT
2  SK * KT 
Per capita income in 2006 (log RMB)   0.205  0.181  0.186  0.188 
  (0.59)  (0.46)  (0.42)  (0.40) 
Male head of household (dummy)  –0.381  –0.419  –0.451  –0.459 
  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.16) 
Education of household head (years)  0.040  0.040  0.042  0.044 
  (0.66)  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.28) 
Minority head of household (dummy)  –0.161**  –0.112  –0.098  –0.115 
  (0.02)  (0.52)  (0.58)  (0.51) 
Cadre family  –0.178  –0.213  –0.211  –0.210 
  (0.69)  (0.48)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
Share of household members aged 11–29, unmarried  1.296  1.319**  1.340**  1.339**  
  (0.24)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Share of household members aged 60 and above  –0.109  –0.085  –0.089  –0.090 
  (0.87)  (0.85)  (0.84)  (0.84) 
Median expenditure per occasion in previous year (log RMB)  –0.001  –0.004  –0.006  –0.007 
  (0.99)  (0.93)  (0.91)  (0.90) 
Dummy for bottom 25% of households in natural village (2004)  1.147  0.183  0.209  0.259 
  (0.34)  (0.68)  (0.58)  (0.43) 
Dummy for top 25% of households in natural village (2006)  0.289  –0.291  –0.344  –0.294 
  (0.88)  (0.50)  (0.35)  (0.42) 
Income distribution * Dummy for bottom 25% of households in natural village  –0.005  0.149*  0.024**  0.005*** 
  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Income distribution * Dummy for middle 50% of households in natural village  0.016  0.060   0.010   0.000  
  (0.55)  (0.45)  (0.43)  (0.49) 
Income distribution * Dummy for top 25% of households in natural village  0.002  0.108  0.025*  0.005*** 
  (0.95)  (0.51)  (0.06)  (0.01) 
R-squared  0.321  0.326  0.33  0.331 
AIC  339  366  365  365 
N  129  129  129  129 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: 
1 SK refers to the skewness of per capita income in the natural village. 
2 KT refers to the kurtosis of per capita income in the natural village. 
3 To avoid double counting of newly established households, we restrict the sample to households with heads aged 40 or above in 2006 (results are robust to other cutoffs). 
p-values (shown in parentheses) reflect standard errors clustered by natural villages. *, **, and *** indicate confidence levels of 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. Village fixed 
effects are included but not reported here.  20 
Table 6b. OLS regressions for wedding expenses paid by the bride’s family 
   Gini  SK
1  KT
2  SK * KT 
Per capita income in 2004 (log RMB)   –0.130  0.002  –0.015  –0.015 
  (0.62)  (0.99)  (0.95)  (0.95) 
Male head of household (dummy)  0.326  0.266  0.334  0.370 
  (0.59)  (0.69)  (0.60)  (0.56) 
Education of household head (years)  0.128***  0.129***  0.124***  0.122*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Minority head of household (dummy)  –0.516**  –0.535**  –0.535**  –0.532**  
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Cadre family  –0.326  –0.341  –0.369  –0.436 
  (0.66)  (0.67)  (0.67)  (0.64) 
Share of household members aged 11–29, unmarried  0.659  0.672  0.679  0.710 
  (0.40)  (0.37)  (0.38)  (0.36) 
Share of household members aged 60 and above  –0.873  –0.940  –0.904  –0.874 
  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.28) 
Median expenditure per occasion in previous year (log RMB)  0.033  0.034  0.035  0.035 
  (0.51)  (0.52)  (0.51)  (0.52) 
Dummy for bottom 25% of households in natural village (2004)  0.291  –0.357  –0.080  0.066 
  (0.92)  (0.62)  (0.89)  (0.89) 
Dummy for top 25% of households in natural village (2004)  –0.957  0.298  0.458  0.513 
  (0.61)  (0.55)  (0.28)  (0.19) 
Income distribution * Dummy for bottom 25% of households in natural village  –0.003  0.255  0.032  0.005 
  (0.95)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.21) 
Income distribution * Dummy for middle 50% of households in natural village  0.002  –0.029  0.004  0.002 
  (0.97)  (0.84)  (0.76)  (0.48) 
Income distribution * Dummy for top 25% of households in natural village  0.044**  0.108  0.017  0.004 
  (0.02)  (0.32)  (0.39)  (0.40) 
R-squared  0.311  0.309  0.306  0.305 
AIC  297  297  297  297 
N  102  102  102  102 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes:
 1 SK refers to the skewness of per capita income in the natural village. 
2 KT refers to the kurtosis of per capita income in the natural village. 
p-values (shown in parentheses) reflect standard errors clustered by natural village. *, **, and *** indicate confidence levels of 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. Administrative 
village fixed effects are included but not reported here. 21 
Although the evidence clearly points to the positional nature of funeral expenditures and groom’s 
wedding expenditures, especially among the poor, the strength of the results may be attenuated by the fact 
that income figures are based on 2004 data and, in many cases, were taken well after the funerals and 
weddings had occurred. The relatively small number of funerals and weddings in any given year 
precludes focusing exclusively on the period subsequent to 2004. However, because gift giving is 
commonplace in China, we are able to validate the results for funerals and weddings by evaluating the 
effect of changes in the key explanatory variables on changes in gift spending between 2004 and 2006. 
Moreover, given the large number of gift exchanges, we allow for different data-generating processes by 
income group by evaluating the determinants of gift spending separately for each income group. Unlike 
spending on funerals and weddings, however, gift giving is often reciprocal in nature; as such, the 
underlying motivation for spending on gifts may differ. For example, as mentioned, risk sharing and 
informal insurance networks may underlie the rapid increases in gift expenditures depicted in Figure 1. 
Therefore, in the regressions that follow, we control for the number of “big events” (reflecting adverse 
income shocks) that may prompt gift exchange within insurance networks.
26
Table 7a describes the determinants of changes in the level of gift giving between 2004 and 2006 
among the poorest quartile of households, as measured in 2004. Changes in per capita income have a 
pronounced effect on changes in gift expenditures over the same period; ceteris paribus, a 1 percent 
increase in the growth of per capita incomes is associated with a 0.72 percent increase in gift spending, 
which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level across all four specifications. Changes in the median 
gift expenditure in the natural village are also associated with increased spending on gifts; holding other 
correlates fixed, a 1 percent greater increase in the median level of spending on gifts in the village is 
associated with a 0.65 percent increase in individual gift spending. This effect is significant at the 10 
percent level when controlling for three of the four income distributions and falls just short of 
conventional statistical significance levels for the fourth. 
  
Although the magnitudes of the estimates differ, these general patterns persist for middle-income 
(Table 7b) and high-income (Table 7c) households. Ceteris paribus, a 1 percent increase in the change in 
income is associated with a 0.28 percent increase in gift spending for middle-income households and a 
0.37 percent increase in gift spending for high-income households, each of which is significant at the 5 
percent level. For middle-income households, the elasticity of changes in gift spending with respect to 
changes in the median spending level exceeds unity (significant at the 1 percent level), suggesting that 
such households are highly responsive to community norms. For high-income households, on the other 
hand, the estimated effect of median gift expenditures is positive but not statistically significant. 
Note that the shock variable does not enter significantly, which confirms that our dependent 
variable captures gift giving rather than risk sharing. Indeed, in our study area, informal insurance is 
mostly organized via zero-interest loans, not via the exchange of gifts. For example, in 2006, 68.4 percent 
of households had access to loans, and 73.4 percent of those loans carried a zero interest rate.  
Finally, to distinguish between evolving social norms and status competition, we again report the 
effect of changes in the four measures of the income distribution on gift expenditures. Results are 
reported in the last row of each table. For poor households, higher moments of the income distribution are 
associated with increased spending on gifts (significant at the 1 percent level), suggesting that a higher 
density of households with similar incomes spurs positional spending. Similar results are evident for 
middle-income households; ceteris paribus, a 1-point increase in the Gini index prompts a 2.5 percent 
increase in gift spending (significant at the 1 percent level). In contrast, gift expenditures among wealthy 
households are not influenced by the income distribution.  
                                                       
26 This variable measures the number of funerals, major illnesses, and widespread deaths of livestock in the natural village; 
illnesses and livestock losses are included if the total value exceeds twice the average income in the village in that year. 22 
Table 7a. OLS regressions for changes in gift giving for low-income households (2004–2006) 
   Gini  SK
1  KT
2  SK * KT 
Change in per capita income (log RMB)  0.694***  0.708***  0.716***  0.721*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Man as household head (dummy)  0.595  0.693  0.792  0.779 
  (0.58)  (0.54)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
Education of household head (years)  –0.047  –0.030  –0.030  –0.031 
  (0.51)  (0.67)  (0.67)  (0.66) 
Minority head of household (dummy)  0.611  0.491  0.431  0.420 
  (0.27)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.44) 
Cadre family  –0.643  –0.695  –0.743  –0.763 
  (0.46)  (0.34)  (0.29)  (0.29) 
Share of household members aged 11–29, unmarried  0.975  1.008  1.056  1.089 
  (0.25)  (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.19) 
Share of household members aged 60 and above  –0.539  –0.477  –0.435  –0.432 
  (0.62)  (0.66)  (0.69)  (0.69) 
Change in the number of big events in natural village  –0.043  –0.024  –0.030  –0.036 
  (0.30)  (0.55)  (0.43)  (0.35) 
Change in median per capita gift expenditure in natural village   0.659*  0.606  0.650*  0.646*  
  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
Change in income distribution at the natural village level  0.006  0.199*  0.033**  0.006**  
  (0.77)  (0.08)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
R-squared  0.161  0.177   0.186   0.185  
AIC  605  603  601  601 
N  138  138  138  138 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes:  
1 SK refers to the skewness of per capita income in the natural village. 
2 KT refers to the kurtosis of per capita income in the natural village. 
3 This variable measures the number of funerals, major illnesses, and widespread deaths of livestock in the natural village; illnesses and livestock losses are included if the total 
value exceeds twice the average income in the village in that year.  
p-values (shown in parentheses) reflect standard errors clustered by natural village. *, **, and *** indicate confidence levels of 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent, respectively. 
Administrative village fixed effects are included but not reported here.   23 
Table 7b. OLS regressions for changes in gift giving in middle-income households (2004–2006) 
   Gini  SK
1  KT
2  SK * KT 
Change in per capita income (log RMB)  0.325**  0.307**  0.306**  0.307**  
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Man as household head (dummy)  0.195  0.227  0.227  0.228 
  (0.70)  (0.66)  (0.66)  (0.65) 
Education of household head (years)  0.003  –0.004  –0.005  –0.004 
  (0.95)  (0.94)  (0.92)  (0.93) 
Minority head of household (dummy)  –0.384*  –0.358  –0.355  –0.359 
  (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
Cadre family  –1.381**  –1.275*  –1.280*  –1.280*  
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Share of household members aged 11–29, unmarried  0.452  0.472  0.474  0.473 
  (0.40)  (0.39)  (0.38)  (0.38) 
Share of household members aged 60 and above  –0.735  –0.789  –0.792  –0.790 
  (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Change in the number of big events in natural village  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.005 
  (0.80)  (0.84)  (0.87)  (0.86) 
Change in median per capita gift expenditure in natural village   1.093***  1.237***  1.240***  1.239*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Change in income distribution at the natural village level  0.029***  0.011  0.000  0.000 
  (0.00)  (0.83)  (0.98)  (0.86) 
R-squared  0.119  0.111   0.111   0.111  
AIC  1541  1544  1544  1544 
N  346  346  346  346 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: 
1 SK refers to the skewness of per capita income in the natural village. 
2 KT refers to the kurtosis of per capita income in the natural village. 
3 This variable measures the number of funerals, major illnesses, and widespread deaths of livestock in the natural village; illnesses and livestock losses are included if the total 
value exceeds twice the average income in the village in that year.  
p-values (shown in parentheses) reflect standard errors clustered by natural village. *, **, and *** indicate confidence levels of 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent, respectively. 
Administrative village fixed effects are included but not reported here. 24 
Table 7c. OLS regressions for changes in gift giving in high-income households (2004–2006) 
   Gini  SK
1  KT
2  SK * KT 
Change in per capita income (log RMB)  0.365**  0.363**  0.365**  0.367**  
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Man as household head (dummy)  1.118***  1.091***  1.099***  1.095*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Education of household head (years)  0.030  0.037  0.036  0.035 
  (0.66)  (0.60)  (0.61)  (0.61) 
Minority head of household (dummy)  0.163  0.124  0.131  0.127 
  (0.64)  (0.72)  (0.70)  (0.71) 
Cadre family  –0.912  –0.867  –0.876  –0.875 
  (0.24)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.26) 
Share of household members aged 11–29, unmarried  0.066  0.107  0.106  0.101 
  (0.92)  (0.87)  (0.88)  (0.88) 
Share of household members aged 60 and above  0.206  0.220  0.220  0.217 
  (0.81)  (0.80)  (0.80)  (0.80) 
Change in the number of big events in natural village  –0.058  –0.052  –0.054  –0.056 
  (0.22)  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.23) 
Change in median per capita gift expenditure in natural village   0.367  0.304  0.316  0.315 
  (0.22)  (0.29)  (0.28)  (0.28) 
Change in income distribution at the natural village level  –0.009  0.058  0.007  0.001 
  (0.55)  (0.52)  (0.61)  (0.62) 
R-squared  0.104  0.104   0.104   0.104  
AIC  956  956  956  956 
N  214  214  214  214 
Source: Authors’ survey data. 
Notes: 
1 SK refers to the skewness of per capita income in the natural village. 
2 KT refers to the kurtosis of per capita income in the natural village. 
3 This variable measures the number of funerals, major illnesses, and widespread deaths of livestock in the natural village; illnesses and livestock losses are included if the total 
value exceeds twice the average income in the village in that year.  
p-values (shown in parentheses) reflect standard errors clustered by natural village. *, **, and *** indicate confidence levels of 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent, respectively. 
Administrative village fixed effects are included but not reported here. 25 
Overall, these results provide mixed evidence for the rank-based status model. Although 
community norms clearly affect spending on funerals and gifts, income distributions also influence some 
categories of spending for some income groups. Specifically, poor households increase expenditures on 
funerals, weddings (conditional on being related to the groom), and gifts when the density mass in their 
part of the income distribution rises—that is, as there is more local competition. In contrast, spending on 
weddings by brides’ families, though equally visible, is better described by other motives for the poor. 
For middle-income and upper-income households, however, the income distribution does not 
systematically affect the level of expenditures on funerals or gifts, suggesting that herding behavior may 
be driving recent escalations in spending in these areas (or that status seeking is perhaps better described 
by another model that is not based on rank-based utility). Thus, the data suggest that the model is 
particularly suitable for describing the behavior of the poorest segment of society, while the behavior of 
high-income groups may be guided by other motives. In addition, results show that competition for status 
is most intense among those who can least afford to compete. 26 
5.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Many empirical studies of status-conferring consumption have focused on developed countries and 
affluent segments of society. This paper provides evidence that status-seeking consumption also exists 
among the poor people in developing countries. Rural parts of developing counties provide an ideal 
setting for studying this phenomenon, because close social interactions and tight social bonds imply 
readily identifiable reference groups. Moreover, status seeking through socially observable consumption 
is a particularly salient phenomenon in the context of extensive rural poverty. The patterns, mechanisms, 
and welfare consequences of status consumption in developing countries thus deserve additional attention 
from scholars. China affords a unique opportunity for studying status-conferring spending, in part because 
rapid changes in income and its distribution within rural communities provide a context in which status 
races may be triggered.  
By using a unique census-type household panel in 26 natural villages in a remote mountainous 
area of China, we show that social spending has escalated, rising faster than income. Our empirical 
evidence shows that household spending on funerals and gifts is positively and significantly correlated 
with lagged median levels of spending in the village. Thus, households follow the reference group’s 
pattern of spending, potentially lowering the welfare of all villagers. By contrast, in the reference group, 
wedding expenses are not affected by such spending. Patterns of positional spending thus appear to 
depend on the expenditure category and the income group concerned. 
Both herding behavior and status concerns are consistent with increased levels of social spending. 
To distinguish between these two phenomena, we consider the effects of interactions between income 
distribution (including higher moments) and income groups on social spending; as far as we are aware, 
this paper is among the first to take this approach. In essence, this approach amounts to testing the rank-
based status model developed by Frank (1985b), Robson (1992) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004). 
Individuals in society compete for a high rank, which may invite socially wasteful races for status through 
excessive positional spending. The rank-based model thus predicts that social spending should be 
responsive to higher order terms of the income distribution in the reference population. This is because 
changing the “density” of households with similar incomes changes the intensity of status competition 
among individuals within that income group. In other words, if social spending is correlated with the 
number of households in the comparison group, then it is consistent with rank-based status seeking (and 
arguably inconsistent with norm-induced herding or risk sharing).  
Although we cannot rule out herding behavior in the case of gift spending for middle-income and 
high-income households, the fact that the poor spend more on funerals, weddings (for the grooms’ 
families), and gifts when the local density of poor people increases suggests that such spending patterns 
are indeed positional. Participating in gift exchange and paying high brideprices may be particularly acute 
among the families of young men, some of whom may be rationed out of the marriage market in the 
presence of increasingly unbalanced sex ratios associated with China’s One Child Policy (Wei and Zhang 
2009). Moreover, whereas gift spending is arguably based on reciprocity and risk sharing, reciprocity is 
certainly unlikely in the case of funerals and weddings. 
Our main findings are that status seeking matters in rural China and that some socially observable 
goods (but not others) are used as vehicles in the race for status. Moreover, our results suggest that the 
poor are especially sensitive to status seeking. The results for the poor are consistent with predictions of 
the rank-based model; however, the same is not true for richer subgroups within our sample. Perhaps 
competition for status takes a different form for these richer individuals. Our findings also suggest that the 
grimmest of scenarios does not unfold—that is, people at the bottom of the income distribution have some 
residual status (our evidence is consistent with the HK model’s s > 0 case) and can opt out of status races 
when some of their peers are upgraded to middle-income echelons; they do not desperately scramble for 
status in a war that cannot be won. 
Nevertheless, the welfare consequences of positional externalities associated with such status 
seeking may be severe for Chinese households living close to subsistence. First and foremost, money 27 
spent on funerals, weddings, and gifts is not available for consumption or productive investments. Status 
competition may have potentially adverse health consequences. For example, in 2004, 41 percent of the 
households in the first administrative village, 29 percent in the second village, and 20 percent in the third 
village sold blood to supplement their incomes; blood sales brought in 9 percent of the annual income to 
the mean household that year. Although blood donation stations in the county were shut down due to 
contamination in late 2006, 9 percent of households continued to rely on blood sales for income, often 
traveling outside the county to make sales. Qualitative evidence gathered at the time of the survey 
revealed that many villagers felt compelled to sell blood so they could build houses for their sons’ 
marriages, afford funerals and weddings, and participate in gift giving. Frequent blood sales have also 
been associated with high local rates of HIV/AIDS (Rosenthal 2000) and hepatitis C (LaFranier 2009) in 
China, suggesting that the long-term consequences of blood sales may be severe. These findings indicate 
that it is especially important to keep an eye on positional spending and its welfare consequences in the 
context of poverty traps.  28 
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